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ARTICLE
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND TO
THE PRESS SHIELD LAW:
"GOOD NIGHT, AND GOOD LUCK"*
By: Timothy M. Mulligan **

M

aryland has long prided itself in being the first State in the country
to enact a press shield law.' The current version of the statute,
codified in Section 9-112 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
of the Maryland Code,2 is predominantly the result of a 1988 re-

* "Good Night, and Good Luck" is the title of a 2005 movie produced by Grant Heslov
and written by Grant Heslov and George Clooney. GOOD NIGHT AND GOOD LUCK (Warner
Independent Pictures 2005). It concerns the conflict between veteran journalist Edward R.
Murrow and U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist investigations in the 1950's.
Id. The movie's title was Murrow's signature expression used in closing his "See It Now" TV
broadcasts. /d.
** B.8., Criminology, 1979, Florida State University; J.D., 1982 and Law Review
Member, University of Baltimore; LL.M. (Taxation), 1984, Georgetown University Law
Center. Mr. Mulligan is the founder of Forensic Advisors, Inc. and represented himself and
Forensic Advisors, Inc. in Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 170 Md. App.
520, 907 A.2d 855, cert. granted, 396 Md. 11, 912 A.2d 648 (2006), appeal dismissed, as
moot prior to oral argument, 397 Md. 396, 918 A.2d 468 (2007). He is a former Assistant
U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, CA and a former trial attorney with the Tax Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. He is a member of the Maryland, District of
Columbia, Colorado, and California bars and was licensed as a Certified Public Accountant in
Virginia.
I
1896 Md. Laws 437; Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561,588-89, 702 A.2d 230,
244 (1997). For a historical review of free press issues in Maryland, see Telnikojf, 347 Md. at
580-95, 702 A.2d at 240-47.
2
The statute provides in part as follows:
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, any judicial,
legislative, or administrative body, or anybody that has the power to issue
subpoenas may not compel any person described in subsection (b) of this
section to disclose:
(I) The source of any news or information procured by the person while
employed by the news media or while enrolled as a student, whether or not
the source has been promised confidentiality; or
(2) Any news or information procured by the person while employed by
the news media, in the course of pursuing a professional activity, or any
news or information procured by the person while enrolled as a student, in
the course of pursuing a scholastic activity or in conjunction with an
activity sponsored, funded, managed, or supervised by school staff or
faculty, for communication to the public but which is not so
communicated, in whole or in part, including:
(i) Notes;
(ii) Outtakes;
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enactment,3 which was designed to substantially expand the law,
providing an absolute privilege for the source of news or information and
a qualified privilege for any unpublished news or information which only
could be overcome per the guidelines advocated by Justice Stewart in his
dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).4
Observers, however, should not necessarily conclude Maryland courts
will enforce the press shield statute. There are only two reported
decisions (both from Maryland's intermediate appellate court)5
interpreting the 1988 re-enactment, and this article posits that both those
decisions structurally followed the plurality opinion in Branzburg, not
Justice Stewart's dissent, in contradiction to the enactment of Section 9112. These rulings raise questions as to what extent a press shield law
exists in Maryland and how future courts may interpret the statute.

(iii) Photographs or photographic negatives;
(iv) Video and sound tapes;
(v) Film; and
(vi) Other data, irrespective of its nature, not itself disseminated in any
manner to the public.
(d)(l) A court may compel disclosure of news or information, if the court
fmds that the party seeking news or information protected under
subsection (c)(2) of this section has established by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(i) The news or information is relevant to a significant legal issue before
any judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or anybody that has the
power to issue subpoenas;
(ii) The news or information could not, with due diligence, be obtained by
any alternate means; and
(iii) There is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
(2) A court may not compel disclosure under this subsection of the source
of any news or information protected under subsection (c)(l) of this
section.
(e) If any person described in subsection (b) of this section disseminates a
source of any news or information, or any portion of the news or
information procured while pursuing an activity described in subsection
(b) of this section, the protection from compelled disclosure under this
section is not waived by the person.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (2010) (hereinafter "Section 9-112" or "press
shield law").
3 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (1988) (current version MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (2010)).
4
See Prince George's County v. Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 603, 822 A.2d 537, 550
(2003) (Maryland's press shield law "is essentially a codification of the factors discussed in
the Branzburg dissent ....").
5 See Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 602-03, 822 A.2d at 549-50; see also Forensic Advisors,
170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855.
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3

BACKGROUND

Maryland first passed a press shield law in 1896. 6 Prior to 1988, the
press shield law in Maryland was a one-sentence statute that protected
only a reporter's sources. 7 The reporter's information itself was not

6

7

1896 Md. Laws 437; Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 589-90, 702 A,2d at 244.
The 1896 version of the press shield law provided:
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or
journal shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial, or
before any committee of the Legislature or elsewhere, the source of any
news or information procured or obtained by him for and published in the
newspaper on an in which he is engaged, connected with or employed.

MD. ANN. CODE ART. XXXV § lA (1896) (current version MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD.PROC. § 9-112 (2010».
In 1949, the law was re-enacted to include radio and television journalist:
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or
journal or for any radio or television station shall be compelled to disclose
in any legal proceeding or trial, or before any committee of the Legislature
or elsewhere, the source of any news or information procured or obtained
by him for and published in the newspaper or disseminated by the radio or
television station on an in which he is engaged, connected with or
employed.
MD. ANN. CODE ART. 35 § 2 (1949) (current version MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 9-112 (2010».
In 1979 (the last re-enactment prior to 1988), the law was re-enacted to be gender neutral
and to protect the source regardless of whether the information was disseminated.
A person engaged in, connected with, or employed on a newspaper or
journal or for any radio or television station may not be compelled to
disclose in any legal proceeding or trial or before any committee of the
Legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news or information that was
obtained by the person for purposes of publication in the newspaper or
journal or for purposes of dissemination by a radio or television station
where the person is engaged, connected with or employed.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (1979) (current version MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (2010».
In 2010, the press shield privilege was extended to student journalists, i.e., persons
"[e]nrolled as a student in an institution of postsecondary education and engaged in any news
gathering or news disseminating capacity recognized by the institution as a scholastic activity
or in conjunction with an activity sponsored, funded, managed, or supervised by school staff
or faculty." See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (b)(2)(2010).
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protected, and if a reporter voluntarily disclosed the source, the privilege
was waived. 8
Although limited, the one-sentence statute at least meant that
Maryland reporters had statutory protection for their sources - something
unavailable at the federal level as of the time of this writing. 9 The only
United States Supreme Court case directly addressing the First
Amendment and journalists' source privilege is Branzburg v. Hayes.lO In
Branzburg v. Hayes, Justice White, writing for himself and Justices
Burger, Blaclanun, and Rehnquist, held that the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution does not provide newspersons with even a qualified
privilege against appearing before a grand jury and being compelled to
answer questions as to either the identity of news sources or information
received from those sources. I I
Justice Powell concurred in the plurality's opinion, but wrote
separately "to emphasize what seems to me to be the limited nature of the
Court's holding. The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to
testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect
to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources." 12 Justice
Powell emphasized that "no harassment of newsmen will be tolerated,"
and that a reporter may move to quash a subpoena if he believes that "the
grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith." \3
In dissent, Justice Douglas argued that journalists should have an
absolute privilege against testifying. 14 In a separate dissent joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stewart advocated a qualified
privilege:
when a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal
confidences, I would hold that the government must (1) show that
there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation
of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be
8
See Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 724-26, 294 A.2d 149, 156-57, aff'd per
curiam, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972); Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 170-73,465 A.2d
413,415-17 (1983).
9
At the time of this writing, the U.S. Senate is considering a federal press shield law
entitled the Free Flow of Information Act, S. 448, III th Congo (2009). The U.S. House of
Representatives passed a similar version of the shield bill in March 2009. H.R. 985, III th
Congo (2009) and 145 Congo Rec. H4202 (daily ed. March 31, 2009).
10
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
II
ld. at 674, 685 (citing Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (1970)).
12
ld. at 709 (powell, J., concurring).
13 ld. at 710.
Justice Powell's concurrence has been cited by some courts and
commentators as evidence that Branzburg did in fact create a qualified reporter's privilege.
See, e.g., Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure §
5426, at 746-47 (1st ed. 1980). This question, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
14
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 711-25.
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obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and
overriding interest in the information. 15
While the plurality in Branzburg did not recognize a constitutional
newsperson's privilege, it acknowledged that individual state legislatures
may create such privileges. 16 In 1988, the Maryland General Assembly
expanded the news media privilege when it repealed the former, onesentence version of the press shield law l7 and re-enacted the current,
multi-paragraph version. The 1988 re-enactment of Section 9-112
represented a substantial increase in the privileges provided the news
media and overruled all of the prior reporter subpoena cases in Maryland
except Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper l8 and WBAL- TV Div., Hearst
Corp. v. State. 19 The holding in Lightman v. State 20 and dictum in State v.
Sheridan,21 stating that Section 9-112 applied only to the source of the
news and not the news or information itself, was overruled by the new
Section 9-112(c)(2). The holding in To/ani v. State,22 that voluntary
disclosure of a source waives the privilege, was overruled by the new
Section 9-112(e).
Bilney, however, was not overruled because it held that a reporter's
characterization of a source as gratuitous or voluntary does not constitute
a waiver. 23 WBAL-TV Div. was not overruled because it assumed,
without deciding, there was a qualified privilege to withhold unpublished
news and applied the standard proposed by Justice Stewart's dissent in
Branzburg. 24 The current Section 9-112 essentially adopted the standard
advocated by Stewart's dissent for unpublished news or information. 25
15
16

ld. at 743.
ld. at 689. Justice White also stated:
There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First
Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the
conditions and problems with respect to the relations between law
enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying,
of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in
their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a
newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.

ld. at 706.
17
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Juo. PROC. § 9-112.
18
43 Md. App. 560,406 A.2d 652, cert. denied, 286 Md. 743 (1979).
19
300 Md. 233,477 A.2d 776 (1984).
20
15 Md. App. 7l3, 294 A.2d 149 (1972).
21
248 Md. 320,322 n.l, 236 A.2d 18,19 n.1 (1967).
22
297 Md. 165, 176,465 A.2d 413, 419 (1983).
23
Bilney, 43 Md. App. at 570, 406 A.2d at 658.
24
WBAL-TV Div., 300 Md. at 243-44, 477 A.2d at 781.
25 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Maryland's current press shield law provides an absolute privilege as
to a reporter's sources of information and a qualified privilege as to any
unpublished information. 26 Pursuant to Section 9-112(c)(2), the qualified
privilege extends to:
Any news or information procured by the person while employed
by the news media, in the course of pursuing professional
activities, for communication to the public but which is not so
communicated, in whole or in part, including:
(i)

Notes;

(ii)

Outtakes;

(iii)

Photographs or photographic negatives;

(iv)

Video and sound tapes;

(v)

Film; and

(vi)

Other data, irrespective of its nature, not
disseminated in any manner to the public.

The qualified privilege can be overcome only by establishing by clear
and convincing evidence all three of the following requirements set forth
in Section 9-112(d)(1):
(i)

The news or information is relevant to a
significant legal issue before any judicial,
legislative, or administrative body, or any
body that the power to issue subpoenas;

(ii)

The news or information could not, with
due diligence, be obtained by any alternate
means; and

(iii)

There is an overriding public interest in
disclosure. [27]

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(c)(1) & (d)(2)(201O).
While no post-1988 Maryland decisions discuss the "public interest" requirement,
other jurisdictions have found that in civil cases, "where the public interest in effective
criminal law enforcement is absent," courts must be "mindful of the preferred position of the
First Amendment and the importance of a vigorous press" which requires finding that " .. .in
the ordinary civil case the civil litigant's interest in disclosure should yield to the journalist's
privilege." Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711-12.; see also Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974) ("in civil cases in which the public interest in
non-disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources outweighs the public and private interest
in compelled testimony").
26
27
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Further, even if a party seeking infonnation satisfies all three of the
requirements of Section 9-112(d)( 1), the issue of disclosure is still in the
court's discretion as Section 9-112(d)( 1) only provides that the court may
order disclosure, not that it shall order disclosure. 28 It is, thus, still within
the court's discretion whether disclosure should be ordered under the
particular circumstances of the case before the court. 29
Since the substantial revisions to the press shield law in 1988, there
have been only two reported appellate decisions interpreting the statute:
Prince George's County v. Hartley30 and Forensic Advisors v. Matrixx
Initiatives. 3l This article argues that both appellate decisions were
decided contrary to the provisions of Section 9-112.

II.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY V. HARTLEY

In Hartley, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County erred in quashing civil
administrative subpoenas on three reporters directing the reporters to give
testimony at a police department disciplinary hearing of a police officer
named Brian Lott. 32
The journalists reported in three separate
newspapers 33 that they overheard Officer Lott say: "I wish 1 would have
been there in '95. I would have shot the bastards, and we wouldn't have
all this crap.,,34
The Hartley court found that the reporters were the "source" of the
infonnation sought, and Section 9-112 does not apply when the reporters
are the "source" of the information. 35 In the alternative, the Hartley court
held that even if the reporters were afforded privileges per Section 928 See Bice v. Bernstein, 1994 WL 555379, at *2, 22 Media L. Rep. 1966 (Md. Cir. Ct.
1994) ("Even if the three prongs are demonstrated to exist by a sufficient quantum of
evidence, the court is not required to order disclosure.").
29
The guarantee of a free press derives from the First Amendment (U.S. CONST. amend.
I.) and Articles 2 & 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. It has been said that the First
Amendment guarantee of a free press is " ... not for the benefit of the press so much as for the
benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our
political system and an open society." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
30
150 Md. App. 581,822 A.2d 537 (2003).
31
170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855 (2006), cert. granted, 396 Md. 11, 912 A.2d 648
(2006), appeal dismissed, as moot prior to oral argument, 397 Md. 396, 918 A.2d 468 (2007).
A third case, Bice, 1994 WL 555379, 22 Media L. Rep. 1966 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1994), was a trial
court opinion.
32
Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 603,822 A.2d at 550.
33
Ruben Castenada reported for The Washington Post, Eric Hartley reported for The
Prince George's Journal, and Gregory C. Johnson reported for The Gazette Newspapers. Id.
at 584, 822 A.2d at 539.
34 Id.
35
Although the Hartley court referred to the reporters as "the source" of the information,
this is technically incorrect. Officer Brian Lott was "the source" of the statements in question.
The reporters merely overheard Officer Lott's statements. By "source," the Hartley court
means the reporter personally observed the information. Id. at 601-02, 822 A.2d at 549.
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112(c)(1) or (2), the court was persuaded that Prince George's County
satisfied the prerequisites of Section 9-112(d). 36

A. Prince George's County Submitted No Evidence in Support of
Its Position
The alternative ruling, however, was contrary to Section 9-112(d)
because Prince George's County did not introduce any evidence in
support of its position. 37 Counsel for Prince George's County merely
made unsubstantiated oral representations to the trial court. 38 "At the
hearing, appellant's counsel represented to the circuit court that the
internal affairs investigator questioned everyone at the courthouse who
might have heard the statement.,,39
Section 9-112(d)(1) provides that the reporter's qualified privilege can
only be overcome with clear and convincing evidence from the party
seeking disclosure. 4o Unsubstantiated allegations of an attorney are not
evidence. 41 In their appellate briefs, two of the reporters emphasized the
lack of evidence submitted by Prince George's County,42 but the Hartley
court ignored this point and did not explain how Prince George's County
satisfied the prerequisites of Section 9-112(d) without submitting any
evidence to support its position.

B. Prince George's County Did Not Exhaust Alternate Means
Section 9-112(d)(1)( ii) requires clear and convincing evidence that
"[t]he news or information could not, with due diligence, be obtained by
any alternate means." The reporters argued that Prince George's County
should be required to receive Officer Lott's testimony before taking
testimony from the reporters, as Officer Lott may admit to the
Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 602-03, 822 A.2d at 550.
See Brief of Appellees Ruben Castaneda and Gregory C. Johnson at 11, Prince
George's County v. Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581,822 A.2d 537 (2003) (No. 2660, Sept. Term,
2001).
38
Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 597, 822 A.2d at 546.
39
/d. (emphasis supplied).
40
The "clear and convincing evidence" required by Section 9-112(d)(I) is a "'heightened
standard' ... [that] requires 'a degree of belief greater than the usually imposed burden of
proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but less than the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt imposed in a criminal case.'" 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 CE v. State, 334
Md. 264,283,638 A.2d 1164, 1173 (l994) (quoting Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 318, 413
A.2d 170, 177 (1980)).
41
See Heard v. Foxshire Assoc., LLC, 145 Md. App. 695, 707, 806 A.2d 348,355 (2002)
(unsworn statements by attorney were merely argument and not evidence); see also Simpson
v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 278, 708 A.2d 1126, 1133 (l998) (allegations in State's pleadings
are not evidence).
42
See Brief of Appellees Ruben Castaneda and Gregory C. Johnson at 11, Prince
George's County v. Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 822 A.2d 537 (2003) (No. 2660, Sept. Term,
2001).
36

37
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statements. 43 In a footnote, the Hartley court dismissed this argument,
speculating that "[i]t is most unlikely that Lott would testify that he made
such a statement. ,,44
The court's conclusion was conjecture. Knowing that three reporters
overheard his statement, Officer Lott may have decided that admitting to
an inappropriate remark, and facing possible sanction from the police
department, was a lesser evil than criminal indictment for perjury.
Section 9-112 places the burden on the party seeking the information to
demonstrate it could not, with due diligence, obtain the information by
alternate means. 45 A decision compatible with the prerequisites of
Section 9-112 would have found that Prince George's County failed to
meet its burden without taking Officer Lott's testimony.

C. Personal Observations ofa Journalist Are Entitled to the Privileges
The Hartley court held that Section 9-112 does not apply when a
reporter is the "source" of the news, and stated:
The legislature, however, made no change to the principle that a
news reporter who personally observes a situation is the "source"
of the information. Because none of the appellees is the "source"
of information protected by the Shield Law, and because all of the
appellees have "communicated" what they claim to have
witnessed, neither C.L. § 9-112(c)(1) nor C.L. § 9-112(c)(2) IS
applicable to the case at bar. [46]
43
See Brief of Appellees Ruben Castaneda and Gregory C. Johnson at 11, Prince
George's County v. Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581,822 A.2d 537 (2003)(No. 2660).
44
Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 597 n.IO, 822 A.2d at 547 n.IO.
45
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §9-112{d)(l){ii). No Maryland case has defined
the meaning of "with due diligence." Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have suggested
the moving party must meet a high burden in order to protect First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("the obligation is clearly very
substantial ... an alternative requiring the taking of as many as 60 depositions might be a
reasonable prerequisite to compelled disclosure"); Shoen v. Shoen,S F.3d 1289, 1296 (9th
Cir. 1993) ("requesting party must demonstrate that she has exhausted all reasonable
alternative means for obtaining the information"); Hutira v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F.
Supp. 2d liS, 122 (D.C. 2002) (even though the party seeking disclosure "may have
considerable difficulty obtaining the information," she still must attempt "to obtain the
information elsewhere").
46
Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 602, 822 A.2d at 549. The court in Hartley also noted: "We
agree with that analysis, which comports to the general rule dating to 1742 that 'the public has
a right to every man's evidence.'" !d. at 593, 822 A.2d at 544. The First Amendment and
Maryland's press shield law, however, did not exist in 1742. Thus, the public now has a more
limited right to evidence discovered by the press and protected by the First Amendment or
shielded under Maryland law. Furthermore, as Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissent in
Branzburg: " ... the longstanding rule making every person's evidence available to the grand
jury is not absolute. The rule has been limited by the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment and the evidentiary privileges of common law." 408 U.S. at 737 (footnotes
omitted).

10
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That ruling, however, was contrary to Section 9-112. First, the press
shield law is not waived even if the source, news, or infonnation is
"communicated.,,47 Second, Section 9-112 makes no distinction as to
whether or not the reporter "personally observed" the news or
infonnation sought in the subpoena. It simply provides an absolute
privilege as to the source of any news or infonnation48 and a qualified
privilege for "any news or infonnation.,,49 The use of the modifier "any"
in Section 9-112(c)( 1) and (2) makes it clear that the absolute privilege
applied to the source of all news or information and the qualified
privilege applies to all unpublished news or infonnation. 5o To restrict the
47
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(e) ("If any person described in
subsection (b) of this section disseminates a source of nay news or information, or any portion
of the news or information procured while pursuing an activity described in subsection (b) of
this section, the protection from compelled disclosure under this section is not waived by the
person").

The Floor Report for Senate Bill 87 (the current Section 9-112) specifically discussed the
waiver issue:
Third, the bill provides that the protection from compelled disclosure is
not waived by dissemination of a source, or of any portion of news or
information procured while pursuing professional activities. This
provision specifically addresses the ruling of the Court of Appeals in
Tofani v. State, 465 A.2d 413 (1983). In that case, the Court ruled that
since Tofani had identified some of her sources in her stories, she had
waived her shield law protection and could be compelled to reveal
information from those sources.
While the Hartley court did not discuss this issue, what it may have meant regarding the
"communication" (i.e., publication) of Lott's statements is that Section 9-112(c)(2) extends
the qualified privilege only to unpublished news or information ("but which is not so
communicated ... "). One interpretation may be that the "communicated" information is not
subject to the qualified privilege of Section 9-112(c).
The Preamble for the statute, however, specifically expressed the intent to grant the
qualified privilege to both published and unpublished information ("whether published or
unpublished, transmitted or not transmitted ... "). A review of the Bill File for Senate Bill 87
provides no explanation as to what the Legislature meant by the "but which is not so
communicated" phrase, but the most logical interpretation is that the actual publication is not
privileged and can be discovered, but any other information is subject to the qualified
privilege. Such an interpretation would be consistent with Section 9-112( e) and the Preamble
to the statute. Similarly, courts in other jurisdictions have held that while the publication itself
may not privileged, efforts simply to verify a published quotation or statement are not
permitted due to their intrusion on a free press. See, e.g., Parsons v. Watson, 778 F. Supp.
214,217 (D. Del. 1991); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982). Nor is
discovery designed to question the veracity or competence of the reporter, editorial bias, etc.,
permitted. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); In re
Consumers Union, 495 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
48
See Section 9-112(c)(1) & (d)(2).
49
Section 9-112( c)(2) (emphasis added).
50
Section 9-112( c)(1 )-(2).
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scope of Section 9-112(c)(1) and (2) only to "news or information not
personally observed by the newsperson" would be equivalent to reading
the word "any" out of the statute.
Further, to restrict Section 9-112(c)(2) only to news or information not
personally observed by a newsperson would essentially eviscerate the
privileges of Section 9-112. For example, it is not uncommon for a
reporter to go undercover in pursuit of a story. 51 In doing so, the reporter
becomes the "source" of what he or she uncovers according to the
Hartley court. 52 Nor is it uncommon for reporters to observe or overhear
a newsworthy matter while performing their normal duties, which would
also qualify the reporters as a "source" based on the Hartley definition. 53
According to Hartley, any time a reporter simply interviews someone, the
reporter is the "source" of information regarding what the interviewee
said. 54 A court applying the Hartley rule would decline to extend the
qualified privilege to information gathered by a reporter in such a
situation. 55 None of these results follow from the language of Section 9112(c) or the intent of the General Assembly in re-enacting the current
version ofthe press shield law. 56
51
See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities, 194 F.3d 505,525 (1999) ("ABC's undercover
reporters presented themselves to Food Lion, representing all ... matters falsely."); Sussman
v. ABC, Inc., 186 F.3d 1200, 1201 (1999) (ABC's undercover reporter made videotapes that
were challenged under federal wiretapping statutes); UnitedStates v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 225,
226 (J 980) ("An undercover investigation by a Kansas City newspaper reporter revealed
Wilson's use of secretaries for his business and Wilson was charged in a six count
indictment. ").
52
See Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 593-94, 822 A.2d at 544 (citing Alexander v. Chicago
Park District, 548 F. Supp. 277, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that news reporters held no
privilege to avoid testifYing about events they personally observed during an investigation».
53
See Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 593, 822 A.2d at 544 (citing Dillon v. San Francisco,
748 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that a cameraman cannot refuse to testifY
about an incident that the cameraman personally observed while filming a different story».
54 See Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 581,822 A.2d at 537.
55
See id.
56
The preamble to Chapter 113 of the 1988 Laws of Maryland articulates the purpose of
the 1988 re-enactment of Section 9-112:

WHEREAS, It is the intention of the General Assembly to grant the news
media an unqualified privilege not to reveal sources of information, and a
qualified privilege not to disclose information, whether published or
unpublished, transmitted or not transmitted; and
WHEREAS, The General Assembly grants these privileges to the news
media to promote the overall freedom of this State's gatherers and
disseminators of information, to give the news media a free and unfettered
flow of information, to perpetuate the necessarily confidential relationship
between news gatherers and their sources of information, and to protect
the public interest ....
1988 Md. Laws 2059 (emphasis added).
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In discussing its holding that the press shield law does not apply when
the reporter is the "source" of the information, the Hartley court relied on
the 1972 decision in Lightman v. State. 57 Lightman involved a newspaper
reporter who, while preparing a story on illegal drug traffic in Ocean
City, Maryland, reportedly observed marijuana use at a pipe ShOp.58 In
response to a grand jury subpoena, the reporter was asked to state the
location of the pipe shop. 59 The reporter refused, stating that to disclose
the location would lead to the disclosure of the source of his story, i.e.,
the pipe shop owner and the source were protected pursuant to the 1972
version of Section 9_112.60
In 1972, Section 9-112 only provided a privilege for the source of
information, not "any news or information" as the current statute
provides. 61 Accordingly, Lightman held:
Where a newsman, by dint of his own investigative efforts,
personally observes conduct constituting the commission of
criminal activities by persons at a particular location, the
newsman, and not the persons observed, is the "source" of the
news or information in the sense contemplated by the statute. To
conclude otherwise in such circumstances would be to insulate
the news itselffrom disclosure and not merely the source . ... [62]
Essentially, Hartley found that the 1988 re-enactment of Section 9-112
did not affect the Lightman holding. 63 Lightman, however, was overruled
in 1988 because the current version of Section 9-112 provides for a
qualified privilege of the news itself regardless of whether the reporter
"personally observed" it. 64
57 Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 600-01,822 A.2d 548-49 (citing Lightman v. State, 15 Md.
App. 713,294 A.2d 149 (1972)).
58
Ughtman, 15 Md. App. at 714, 294 A.2d at 151.
59
Id. at 714-15, 294 A.2d at 151.
60
Id. at 715-16, 294 A.2d at 151-52.
61
See id. at 717-18, 294 A.2d at 153. See also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9112 (West 2010).
62
Lightman, 15 Md. App. at 725, 294 A.2d at 156-57 (emphasis added).
63
Hartley, 150 Md. App. at 601-02, 882 A.2d at 549.
64
Id. at 602, 822 A.2d at 549. The Hartley court cited seven of out-of-state cases it
represented found consistent with its holding. Hartley at 593, 822 A.2d at 544. All cases,
however, are inapposite to MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2010). For
example, State v. Knutson, 523 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) noted that, unlike
Maryland, Minnesota's press shield law applies to a reporter's sources, not to unpublished
information that does not identify a source. 523 N.W.2d at 912.

Furthermore, in State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1996), the Minnesota Supreme
Court refused to find that the Minnesota Constitution provided more protection to the press
than the United States Constitution and following the Branzburg plurality opinion, held that
that a reporter may be compelled to testify to events he personally observed. Id. at 628. The
Ziegler, Alexander, and Dillon courts, lacking federal press shield law, also relied on the
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FORENSICADVISORS V. MATRIXX INITIATIVES

At issue in Forensic Advisors v. Matrixx Initiatives was a subpoena
issued by Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx") in August 2004 to
Maryland-based Forensic Advisors, Inc., ("Forensic Advisors") a
publisher of a non-party financial newsletter, The Eyeshade Report.
Matrixx brought a defamation suit in Arizona against several
pseudonymous Internet-message-board posters. 65
While Forensic
Advisors did not post anything on the Internet regarding Matrixx, they
expressed concerns regarding Matrixx' s accounting and business
operations and noted reports of possible health risks of some of its
Zicam® homeopathic cold-remedy products. 66 In 2009, the FDA issued a
press release advising consumers not to use certain Zicam® cold-remedy
products "because they are associated with the loss of sense of smell,
anosmia. Anosmia may be long-lasting or permanent.,,67
plurality opinion in Branzburg. See In re: Ziegler, 550 F. Supp. 530 (W.O.N.Y. 1982);
Alexander v. Chi. Park Dist., 548 F.Supp. 277 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Dillon v. S.F., 748 F. Supp.
722 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Compare with supra text accompanying note 4 (discussing Maryland's
codification of Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg).
The Hartley court also relied on Bell v. Des Moines, 412 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 1987),
whereby the Bell court reversed and remanded a trial court ruling permitting discovery of
news footage. The court held that the footage was presumptively privileged and the party
seeking the footage failed to establish the footage was necessary to its case or that it had
exhausted other sources for the information. Id. at 588. In contrast, the Hartley Court
rejected the alternative source rule. 150 Md. App. at 592-93,822 A.2d at 543-44.
Finally, in Bartlett v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 178, 722 P.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1986) the
court held that a party in a personal injury suit resulting from an auto accident was entitled to
a news station's videotape of the accident because, unlike Maryland's press shield law,
Arizona's press shield law only protects against disclosure of confidential sources. Bartlett,
150 Ariz. at 183,722 P.2d at 351.
65
170 Md. App. at 532, 907 A.2d at 861.
66 Id. at 524, 907 A.2d at 857. Matrixx is publicly traded on the NASDAQ as MTXX.
Id. at 523, 907 A.2d at 857.
67
Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Advises Consumers Not To Use
Certain Zicam Cold Remedies: Intranasal Zinc Product Linked to Loss of Sense of Smell
(June
16,
2009),
http://www.fda.govlNewseventslNewsroomlPressAnnouncements/
ucmI67065.htrn. Matrixx's stock priced declined 70% on the day of the FDA press release.
See, e.g., Susan Heavey, "Zicam Recall Could Cost $10 Million, Shrink Company," Reuters,
18,
2009,
http://www.reuters.com!article/2009/06118/us-matrixx-zicamJune
idUSTRE55H43Z20090618. In a warning letter addressed to Matrixx that same day, the FDA
stated: "We are not aware of any data establishing that the Zicam Cold Remedy intranasal
products are generally recognized as safe and effective for the uses identified in their
labeling." Letter, U.S. Food and Drug Admin. (June 16, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/ICECII
EnforcementActions/WamingLetters/ucmI66909.htm (emphasis added). The FDA noted that
it had received 130 complaints indicating loss of smell resulting from Zicam® product usage,
and discovered Matrixx failed to inform the FDA of an additional 800 complaints of Zicam
induced anosmia. Id. In a subsequent filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), Matrixx admitted receiving approximately 2,000 anosmia-related
complaints from consumers from the time Zicam intranasal products were put on the market
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The subpoena at issue, the second subpoena Matrixx issued to
Forensic Advisors, sought, inter alia, information regarding Forensic
Advisors' sources and subscribers. 68 Matrixx claimed it needed the
information because some of the pseudonymous Internet posters made
references to a Forensic Advisors' report. 69
On appeal, Forensic Advisors argued, inter alia, that it was entitled to
the "news media shield" of Section 9-112 and that Matrixx had not
satisfied the requirements of Section 9-112(d), and therefore, the trial
court erred in denying its motion to quash the second subpoena. 70
Forensic Advisors also maintained that the First Amendment guarantees
the right to speak anonymously, and that Matrixx should not be allowed
to conduct discovery that might lead to the identity of anonymous
speakers without first demonstrating that it has a legitimate case and that
its rights, on balance, outweigh the rights of the anonymous speakers. 71
The Court of Appeals of Maryland subsequently adopted this position in
an unrelated case, Independent News v. Brodie.72
The Forensic Advisors court did not address the Internet posters' First
Amendment right to speak anonymously, but found that financial
newsletters like The Eyeshade Report are entitled to the news media
shield privilege. 73 Nonetheless, the Forensic Advisors court refused to
quash the subpoena "because it is clear that the subpoenas issued to
appellants seek much more information than is subject to protection under
the statute.,,74 The court held that Forensic Advisors first must respond
in 1999 through July 7, 2009. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., Current Report (Fonn 8-K)
(Nov. 19, 2009).
68
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 525-26, 907 A.2d at 858-59.
69
Id. at 528, 907 A.2d at 859. See also Brief for the Appellees at 6-7 Forensic Advisors,
Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855 (2006) (No. 02621, Sept.
Tenn, 2004), 2005 WL 2705524 at *6-7.
70
Brief for the Appellants at 28-31, Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.,
170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855 (2006) (No. 02621, Sept. Tenn, 2004), 2005 WL 2705523 at
*28-31.
71
Brief for the Appellants, Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 170 Md.
App. 520,907 A.2d 855 (2006) (No. 02621, Sept. Tenn, 2004).
72
407 Md. 415, 966 A.2d 432 (2009).
73
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 535, 907 A.2d at 863. The Matrixx court cited
Summit Technology v. Healthcare Capital, 141 F.R.D. 381 (D. Mass. 1992), as consistent with
its holding that financial newsletters met the definition of "news media" per Section 9112(a)(9). But, in this era of Internet blogging, the question of "who is a reporter"
undoubtedly will be contested in mUltiple courts in the future. While no court has yet
established a universally accepted definition, at least three U.S. Courts of Appeals have
considered the question and all arrived at a similar conclusion, i.e., investigative journalists
who intend to distribute the results of their investigation to the public from the inception of
their investigation are entitled to the privilege regardless of their medium of distribution. See
von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987);
Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (1993), appeal after remand, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995); In re
Madden, 151 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1998).
74
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 535, 907 A.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
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and object to the discovery "on a question-by-question basis" and,
thereafter, the court would review whether the press shield privileges
applied. 75

A. Matrixx Submitted No Evidence in Support ofIts Position
Just as in Hartley, the Forensic Advisors decision was contrary to
Section 9-112 because the court relied on unsubstantiated representations
in Matrixx's brief rather than the "clear and convincing evidence"
required by Section 9-112(d)(I).76 Matrixx made no showing that the
information sought was relevant to a significant legal issue because it did
not produce any of the alleged defamatory statements at issue. 77 Nor did
Matrixx produce any evidence of a link between Forensic Advisors'
report and the alleged defamatory Internet postings. 78 Matrixx also failed
to show that the information could not be obtained by alternate means or
demonstrate that there was an overriding public interest in disclosure. 79

B. The Qualified Privilege Extends to Any Unpublished News or
Information
The court gave no explanation, guidelines, or indication as to what
information sought by Matrixx constituted "much more information than
is subject to protection" pursuant to the press shield statute. 80 This may
be because the ruling is inconsistent with the statute as the qualified
privilege of Section 9-1l2(c)(2) extends to "any" unpublished news or
information. There is no such thing as "much more information" than

75 !d. at 535, 907 A.2d at 864. The court declined to consider Forensic Advisors'
argument that none of the claims in Matrixx's complaint stated a ground upon which relief
could be granted, holding that "[t]his argument ... was not presented to [the trial court]." Id.
at 533, 907 A.2d at 862. This is incorrect, however, as more than half of Forensic Advisors'
opening trial brief (pp. 7-23) dealt with deficiencies in Matrixx's complaint and case. The
"significant legal issue" requirement of Section 9-112(d)(1)(i) necessitates establishing that
the underlying lawsuit is legitimate because a legal issue would be moot, not significant, if a
complaint were legally deficient or the underlying lawsuit were meritless. See id. at 528-29,
907 A.2d at 860.
76
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-ll2(d)(1) (West 2010).
77
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-ll2(d)(l )(i) (West 2010).
78
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 526-27, 907 A.2d at 858-59.
79
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-ll2(d)(l)(ii-iii) (West 2010). Matrixx
submitted only six exhibits in support of its opposition to the motion to quash the subpoena.
The exhibits included a copy of Forensic Advisors' report on Matrixx dated August 26, 2003
(E108-13I); the subpoena at issue (E132-l38); an affidavit of service of the subpoena (E139);
and three letters between counsel for Matrixx and Forensic Advisors discussing the subpoena
at issue. See Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 524-28, 907 A.2d at 857-59. Matrixx's only
witness was its process server who testified regarding a dispute concerning whether the
subpoena was properly served. See id. at 525, A.2d at 858. Matrixx proffered no additional
witnesses or exhibits.
80 Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 535, 907 A.2d at 863.
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"any
information.,,81 The legislature could hardly be more allencompassing than extending the privilege to "any" unpublished news or
information. 82

C. The Burden is on the Party Seeking Information to Meet the
Requirements of Section 9-J 12(d)(J)(ii)

The finding that a reporter must first respond and object to the
discovery "on a question-by-question basis,,,83 and, thereafter, the court
will review whether the press shield privileges apply is contrary to the
language and legislative intent of the press shield law. First, Section 9112 does not mandate proceeding on a question-by-question basis. 84
Rather, Section 9-112(d)(1)(ii) places the burden on the party seeking
information to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, inter alia,
that the "information could not, with due diligence, be obtained by any
alternate means . . . ." The plaintiff s burden is triggered by the reporter
filing a motion to quash the subpoena. 85 Second, requiring the reporter to
respond initially on a question-by-question basis before moving to quash
the subpoena defeats the General Assembly's intent to allows journalists
to disseminate information to the public in a ''free and unfettered'
manner.86
Third, if journalists were forced to attend depositions or otherwise
respond to discovery on a question-by-question basis before the party
seeking information demonstrated it can meet the requirements of Section
81
See id., 907 A.2d at 863. Section 9-112(c)(2), extends the qualified privilege to "[a]ny
news or information procured by the person while employed by the news media, in the course
of pursuing a professional activity ...." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-l12(c)(2)
(West 2010). This suggests that if a reporter has any information procured while not
employed by the news media, it may be discoverable. See id. This was not an issue in
Forensic Advisors, however, because the reporter was employed by Forensic Advisors during
the relevant period. See Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 526-27, 907 A.2d at 858-59.
82
See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the modifier
"any" in Section 9-112( c)(I) & (2)).
83
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 535, 907 A.2d at 864.
84
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2010).
85
Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581, 603, 822 A.2d 537, 550 (2003) (the court acknowledged
that Section 9-112 "is essentially a codification of the factors discussed in the Branzburg [i.e.,
Justice Stewart's] dissent." In Branzburg, Justice Stewart noted that the requirements a party
seeking discovery must meet are triggered once the reporter moves to quash the subpoena.
408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) ("Obviously, before the government's burden to make such a
showing were triggered, the reporter would have to move to quash the subpoena ... ,"). Even
in non-reporter cases, First Amendment considerations require allowing the interested party to
file a motion to quash. See, e.g., Brodie, 407 Md. at 457,966 A.2d at 457 ("a trial court ...
should ... withhold action to afford the anonymous posters a reasonable opportunity to file
and serve opposition to the application .... "). See also Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d. 941,
955 (D.C. 2009) (" ... the court should delay action to allow [the recipient] a reasonable
opportunity to file a motion to quash the subpoena.").
86
1988 Md. Laws 2059, supra note 56.
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9-112(d)( 1), then there is little downside to serving discovery subpoenas
on reporters in the hope of possibly eliciting some information. The party
seeking information would thereby be using the journalists as cheap
investigators. Justice Stewart expressed a similar concern in his dissent
in Branzburg,87 as did the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
in its testimony to the Maryland House Judiciary Committee in favor of
the current version of Section 9_112.88
Fourth, requiring a reporter to respond initially to a subpoena on a
question-by-question basis will only increase the distraction resulting
from the subpoena and possibly stop a reporter's investigation in its
tracks. 89 As one court noted:
The autonomy of the press would be jeopardized if resort to its
resource materials, by litigants seeking to utilize the
news gathering efforts of journalists for their private purposes,
were routinely permitted (citations omitted). Moreover, because
journalists typically gather information about accidents, crimes,
and other matters of special interest that often give rise to
litigation, attempts to obtain evidence by subjecting the press to
discovery as a nonparty would be widespread if not restricted.
The practical burdens on time and resources, as well as the
consequent diversion of journalistic effort and disruption of

87
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 744, n. 34 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("If this requirement [i.e.,
probable cause that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable
violation of criminal law] is not met, then the government will basically be allowed to
undertake a "fishing expedition" at the expense of the press.").
88
Ms. Janet Kirtley, Executive Director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, stated:

There also is no current safeguard in Maryland law to deter those with
subpoena power from exploiting journalist as cheap investigators.
Cavalier use of subpoenas by lazy govemment officials or litigants is
deterred by the requirement that alternative sources of information be
pursued with due diligence before ajournalist is subpoenaed.
Statement of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press Regarding Senate Bill No. 87
before the Maryland House Judiciary Committee, March 8,1988, p. 6 (emphasis supplied).
89
For example, as Forbes magazine reported, Forensic Advisors used to publish
approximately 70 reports a year. See MacDonald, Elizabeth, Legal Congestion, FORBES, Dec.
12,2005, available at http://www.forbes.comlforbesI2005/1212/060.html. If70 companies a
year served two subpoenas each on a one-person newsletter like Forensic Advisors (two
subpoenas were served in the Matrixx case), the reporter would spend 140 days a year (2 x 70,
i.e., more than half the business days in a year) attending depositions, responding to document
requests, etc. This would defeat the General Assembly'S intent " ... to give the news media a
free and unfettered flow of information .... " Pmbl. to ch. 113 of 1988 Md. Laws, supra note
56. Further, a media company may be forced, due to ethical reasons, to remove a reporter
from an investigation once he testifies pursuant to a SUbpoena.
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news gathering activity, would be particularly inimical to the vigor
of a free press. [90]
Fifth, a subpoena may be used by the target of a reporter's
investigation to harass or intimidate the reporter from continuing his
investigation or to retaliate for past stories. Requiring every subpoenaed
reporter to appear, produce records, and answer or object to inquiries on a
question-by-question basis enhances the possibility that a subpoena
would be used for ulterior motives (e.g., "send a message" to the reporter
that he might be added as a defendant in a lawsuit).
Sixth, requiring a reporter to appear and respond prior to the showing
mandated by Section 9-112(d)(1) may give the appearance that the
reporter is a tool of the party seeking the information. This may deter
current or future sources from communicating with the reporter. 91
Seventh, requiring a reporter to respond on a question-by-question basis
adds to the time and expense involved in journalistic pursuits. As one
court noted, the "frequency of subpoenas would not only preempt the
otherwise productive time of journalists and other employees but
measurably increase expenditures for legal fees.,,92 In this era of
shrinking profits, personnel, and outright closures of media organizations,
lost time and increased legal fees are legitimate concerns.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Forensic Advisors' petition
for writ of certiorari. 93 Rather than present an argument, however,
Matrixx dismissed its subpoena and the underlying suit in the Arizona
court just weeks before briefs were due in Maryland. Matrixx then
moved the Court of Appeals of Maryland to dismiss the appeal as moot
due to dismissal of its underlying case. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal as moot over Forensic Advisors' request to hear the case
despite the dismissal due to the public interest involved and as an issue
capable of repetition but escaping review. 94

O'Neil v. Oakgrove Constr. Co., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279 (N.Y. 1988).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Permitting
litigants unrestricted, court-enforced access to journalistic resources would risk the symbolic
harm of making journalists appear to be an investigative arm of the judicial system, the
government, or private parties"); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("[S]ources will clearly be deterred from giving information, and reporters will clearly be
deterred from publishing it, because of uncertainty about exercise of the power [to subpoena]
wi11lead to self-censorship.").
92
U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (lstCir. 1988).
93
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855, cert. granted, 396 Md. 11, 912
A.2d 648 (2006).
94
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855, appeal dismissed, as moot prior
to oral argument, 397 Md. 396, 918 A.2d 468 (2007).
90

91
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LESSONS FROM HARTLEY AND FORENSIC ADVISORS

The takeaway from Hartley and Forensic Advisors is that courts
reviewing Maryland's press shield law may have difficulty reconciling
the court decisions with Section 9-112.
While the statute is
straightforward, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland's application
has been anything but. 95
Since Hartley and Forensic Advisors are the only appellate decisions
in Maryland interpreting the 1988 re-enactment of the press shield law,
advocates of free press and free speech should be concerned that those
decisions may be relied upon by other courts. The concern is only
heightened when these decisions are viewed in light of some other
peculiarities of Maryland law. For example, per Forensic Advisors, if the
target of an embarrassing or critical news article wants to retaliate or
possibly prevent publication, the target may file a John Doe defamation
suit in any state, not name the reporter as a party, and serve multiple
subpoenas on the reporter, asking for a voluminous amount of
information.
In accord with Forensic Advisors, the target need not present any
evidence that a John Doe defamed him, that he suffered any damages, or
that John Doe even exists. All that is required is that the target make
unsubstantiated allegations in a brief. Under this scenario, the target can
serve multiple subpoenas on the reporter, which will not be quashed
provided the subpoenas cross that undefined threshold into "much more
information than is subject to protection under the statute.,,96 In this
manner, the target can tie the reporter up in depositions or court and
convey the message that there may be more litigation to come (e.g.,
naming the reporter as a defendant).
The advantages of not naming the reporter as a party are at least threefold. First, the target does not risk the possibility of the reporter moving
to dismiss the suit pursuant to Maryland's anti-SLAPp97 statute. 98

95
For an example of a straightforward application of the statute to the facts, see the trial
court opinion in Bice v. Bernstein, 1994 WL 555379, 22 Media L. Rep. 1966 (Md. Cir. Ct.
1994).
96
Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. at 535,907 A.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
97
"SLAPP" is an acronym for "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation." The
term was first coined by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan of the University of Denver.
See Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35
Soc. PROBLEMS 506 (1988); George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 3,4 (1989). The term originally referred to meritless
defamation lawsuits usually brought by well-financed plaintiffs against less well-financed
defendants who had attempted to petition the government pursuant to the First Amendment in
opposition to some action the plaintiff was undertaking (e.g., real estate development). The
term has since been expanded to include all suits wherein a plaintiff is attempting to intimidate
a defendant from exercising his First Amendment rights by filing a meritless defamation suit.
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Second, it denies the reporter the opportunity to use discovery to further
the reporter's investigation since a non-party has no discovery rights. 99
Third, in Maryland, the reporter cannot obtain redress for the misuse of
the discovery process via a suit for abuse of process because Maryland is
the only state in the country that limits abuse of process suits to plaintiffs
who can show they have suffered either arrest or seizure of property. 100
The Hartley and Forensic Advisors decisions also encourage anyone
with subpoena power to use reporters as cheap investigators. This should
be a troubling development for the news media. As a recent research
See, e.g., Global Telemedia Int'I v. Does 1 through 35, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1265 (C.D. Cal.
2001).
The issue of SLAPP suits has been the subject of numerous books and articles. A small
sampling includes: LAWRENCE SOLEY, CENSORSHIP, INC.: THE CORPORATE THREAT TO FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (Monthly Review Press 2002); GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE
CANAN, SLAPPs: GETIING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (Temple University Press 1996);
MICHELANGELO Delfino & MARY E. DAY, BE CAREFUL WHO You SLAPP (MoBeta Publishing
2002); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L. J. 855 (2000); Joshua R. Furman, Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP:

Analyzing Defamation Suits Against Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation, 25 SEATILE U. L. REv. 213,217 (2001).
The problem of SLAPP suits is so pervasive that Maryland and 25 other states have
enacted some type of anti-SLAPP legislation. For a list of the 25 other states with antiSLAPP legislation, see The First Amendment Center's website, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.orgiabout.aspx?id=13565. In addition, Colorado and West
Virginia have case law deterrents. See Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E. 2d 28 (W. Va. 1981); Protect
Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (1984). Federal anti-SLAPP
legislation was introduced in December 2009. At the time of this writing, the bill had four
sponsors in the House of Representatives, but has not yet been passed by the House. See The
Citizen Participation Act, H.R. 4364, III th Congo (2009).
98
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (West 2010).
99
See MD. RULES 2-401 and 3-401 (West 2010).
100
See One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Y. Guerriero, 346 Md. 29, 694 A.2d 952 (1997).
Contrary to the assertions of the One Thousand Fleet court, no other state limits abuse of
process claims to only instances of arrest of seizure of property. See Jeffrey J. Utermohle,
Look What They Done to My Tort, Ma, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 26-30 (2002). While
Maryland's restrictions on abuse of process suits may violate Article 19 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights and the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, to date no reported
decision has discussed this issue. The "Petition Clause" refers to the last section of the First
Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridgmg the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. art. I. Art. 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property,
ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to
have justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and
speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land.
MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 19 (West 2010).
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report noted, "amid catastrophic revenue declines, media companies
struggling to stay afloat have less money to throw into court fights to
enforce their journalistic rightS."IOI With revenues falling precipitously,
the news media can hardly afford receipt of an increasing number of
subpoenas. 102
The situation may be even grimmer for a non-reporter critic. After all,
if a journalist cannot quash a subpoena even with the privileges of
Section 9-112, what chance does a non-newsperson critic have of
protecting his or her First Amendment rights?
All may not be lost, however, for the non-reporter critic. The nonreporter critic could argue that the subpoena implicates the First
Amendment because the critic exercised his or her First Amendment right
of free speech by speaking critically of the target. Such a subpoena
requires examination under "the much more exacting scrutiny required by
the First Amendment" because it deals with issues "within the protective
umbrella of the First Amendment.,,103
In Lubin v. Agora, the Court of Appeals of Maryland quashed a
subpoena from Maryland's Securities Commissioner that sought a list of
subscribers from Agora, a financial publishing company.l04 The court
reasoned that "Agora's subscribers may be discouraged from reading its
materials if they are interviewed by government personnel investigating
potential securities violations, even if the readers are told that,
individually, they are not under investigation.,,105 Similarly, the service
of a subpoena on a non-party critic by a civil defamation plaintiff may
discourage the non-party from further exercise of its First Amendment
rights of free speech and may be an effort to retaliate for past critical
comments, even if the critic is not named as a party. 106
Further, discovery requests that may chill First Amendment rights
require a court to balance the First Amendment interest of the recipient
against the interest of the requesting party, as in the recently decided case
of Independent Newspapers v. Brodie.107 In Brodie, the court held that
before a defamation plaintiff may conduct discovery relating to First
Amendment rights of anonymous speakers, the plaintiff must establish
that it has a prima facie case. 108 The court then must balance the First
See Peter Katel, Press Freedom, CQ RESEARCH, Feb. 5, 20 I 0, at 97.
See id.
103 Lubin v. Agora, 389 Md. I, 16,22,882 A.2d 833, 842, 846 (2005).
104
Id. at 27, 882 A.2d at 849.
105
Id. at 22, 882 A.2d at 846.
106
Agora was decided before the Court of Special Appeals decision in Matrixx, but the
Matrixx court made no reference to it. See Matrixx, 170 Md. App. 520, 907 A.2d 855.
107 407 Md. 415, 966 A.2d 432 (2009).
108 Brodie, 407 Md. at 441-42, 966 A.2d at 448. The Brodie court defined aprimajacie
case as follows:
101
102
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Amendment rights of the anonymous speaker "against the strength of the
prima facie case of defamation presented by the plaintiff and the
necessity for disclosure . . . . ,,109
The Brodie and Agora decisions
provide a basis for a non-reporter critic to quash a subpoena by a target of
criticism despite the rulings in Hartley and Forensic Advisors. In light of
the decisions in Hartley and Forensic Advisors, journalists would be
well-advised to cite Brodie and Agora in support of their efforts to quash
a subpoena.
V.

CONCLUSION

In commenting on the Forensic Advisors case, The Wall Street Journal
noted that the result "probably will let the next Jeff Skilling I 10 sleep a bit
better at night. ,,111
While neither Forensic Advisors nor Hartley were decided pursuant to
the provisions of the press shield statute, 112 the concern is that trial courts
and the intermediate appellate courts may follow the decisions. l13 Free
press and free speech advocates should hope that in future cases the Court
of Appeals of Maryland will issue a writ of certiorari on its own initiative
prior to consideration of reporter subpoena cases by the Court of Special
To establish a prima facie case of defamation, then, the plaintiff must
show: "(I) that the defendant made a defamatory statement to a third
person, (2) that the statement was false, (3) that the defendant was legally
at fault in making the statement, and (4) that the plaintiff thereby suffered
harm." Offen v. Brenner, 402 Md. at 191,935 A.2d 719 at 723-24 (2007).
In the case of defamation per quod, extrinsic facts must be alleged in the
complaint to establish the defamatory character of the words or
conduct ....
ld.
Brodie, 407 Md. at 456, 966 A.2d at 457 (emphasis supplied).
Jeffrey Skilling is the former President and CEO of Enron Corp. In 2006, he was
convicted of multiple federal felony charges related to Enron's financial collapse. See Mark
Sherman, High court hears ex-Enron CEO Skillings Appeal, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. I,
2010, 3:39 PM), available at http://finance.yahoo.comlnewslHigh-court-hears-exEnron-CEOapf-692969977.html?x=0&sec=topStories&pos=5&asset=&ccode=.
III
See Jesse Eisinger, Long & Short: Why independent research is drying up, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 8,2006) available at http://www.post-gazette.comlpg/06067/666994-28.stm.
112
See Forensic Advisors, 170 Md. App. 520,907 A.2d 855; Hartley, 150 Md. App. 581,
822 A.2d 537.
113
The author of both the Hartley and Forensic Advisors decisions, former Chief Judge of
the Court of Special Appeals Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., reportedly is very influential among the
Maryland jUdiciary. Judge Murphy was recently appointed to the Court of Appeals and is the
author of the Maryland Evidence Handbook, which he updates annually. A December 2007
newspaper article about Judge Murphy quoted one observer as saying: "I've found myself in
court when a judge doesn't know the answer to a question, and they say they're going to go
research a legal issue. Later, you find out all they did is go call Judge Murphy .... Their
version of 'research' is to call Judge Murphy for advice." See, Andrew A. Green, Murphy
named to Court of Appeals, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Dec. 5,2007), available at http://articles.
baltimoresun.coml2007 -12-05/news/0712050 197_1_chief-judge-judge-murphy.
109
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Appeals of Maryland in the hope that the issues raised herein will be
addressed and resolved in accordance with Section 9_112.114

114
The Court of Appeals of Maryland historically has issued a writ of certiorari on its
own initiative prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals of a number of First
Amendment cases. See, e.g., Brodie, 407 Md. 415; 966 A.2d 432 (2009); Agora. 389 Md. 1,
882 A.2d 833 (2005); WBAL-TV Div.• Hearst Corp., 300 Md. at 238, 477 A.2d at 778; To/ani,
297 Md. at 168, 465 A.2d at 415.

